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In the face of the epidemic of copyright infringement that has been 
afflicting our nation, I suggest that the federal courts have been under-
utilized for the prosecution of copyright crimes. There are those who 
might find this a strange statement for me to make, since I am the author 
of a number of articles railing against the expansion of the criminal juris-
diction of the federal courts.1 But my criticism has been directed at the 
congressional exercise of power to criminalize conduct that traditionally 
has been the concern of the States. I have recommended that the defini-
tion of federal crimes be limited to anti-social behavior that primarily is a 
matter of national concern.2 
In an effort to consolidate and pare down the 3,000-odd United States 
Code provisions criminalizing acts and omissions of various kinds, I would 
also eliminate a number of anachronistic provisions. Among these are the 
transportation of water hyacinths in interstate commerce,3 the impersona-
tion of a member of the 4-H Oub,4 and the movement of dentures into a 
State without the permission of a local dentist.5 Ever since the Supreme 
Court decided that Congress could define a crime on the basis of conduct 
that somehow affects interstate commerce,6 Congress has demonstrated 
precious little capacity for self-restraint in this area. After all, what legisla-
tor can resist advising his or her constituents that a new federal crime has 
1 See, e.g., Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 Syr. 
L Rev. 681 (1991); Roger J. Miner, The Consequences of Federalizing Crim-
inal Law, Criminal Justice, Spring 1989, at 16. 
2 Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 Harv. J.L. 
& Pub. Pol'y 117, 127 (1987). 
3 18 u.s.c. § 46. 
4 Id.§ 916. 
s Id. § 1821. 
6 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155 (1971). 
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been defined and, accordingly, that some problem or other has been 
solved? The fact that a corresponding state crime already exists is of no 
moment to those who enact our federal laws. 
The situation is much different, in my opinion, when it comes to the 
definition of copyright crimes. Copyright is a matter of national interest, 
and it has been so since the adoption of the federal Constitution. The 
Constitution not only confers upon Congress the power to legislate in the 
area of copyrights and patents, but it also tells us why such legislation is 
socially beneficial: the power is to enact laws to "secur[e] for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries;" the beneficial purpose of such laws is "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts.''7 James Madison, one of 
the authors of that well-known series of persuasive articles urging ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, made some interesting comments about these 
provisions. In Federalist No. 43, Madison wrote: 
The utility of tlris power will scarcely be questioned. The 
copy right of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Brit-
ain to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions, 
seems with equal reason to belong to inventors. The public good 
fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of individuals. The 
States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of 
these cases. & 
Madison thus made two important points, both of which favor copy-
right enforcement through federal criminal prosecution. First, he ob-
served that the public good, by which he meant the national interest, 
coincides with the copyright claims of individuals, by which he meant the 
private interest. Second, he asserted that the States cannot be effective in 
separately providing for copyright enforcement. I shall return to the sec-
ond point a little later. As to Madison's first point, the Supreme Court has 
made it abundantly clear just what is the more important interest to be 
served. The Court has written that the monopoly privileges granted to 
authors and inventors are "limited in nature and must ultimately serve the 
public good."9 The Court also has written that "copyright law ... serves 
the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative 
works,"10 and that "private motivation must ... serve its cause of promot-
ing broad public availability of literature, music and the other arts. "11 In a 
7 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
B The Federalist No. 43, at 217-18 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic ed. 1982). 
9 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029 (1994). 
10 Id. at 1030. 
11 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
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recent case holding that ordinary compilations generally are not copyright-
able, the Supreme Court put it this way: 
[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, 
but encourages them to build freely upon the ideas and informa-
tion conveyed by a work.12 
We are thus left with the understanding that the purpose of copyright 
law is no less than the dissemination of knowledge, the promotion of cul-
tural enrichment, the conveyance of information and the consequent bet-
terment of society through the encouragement of creativity and 
innovation. This being so, what could be a more important matter of na-
tional interest than the enforcement of copyright law? 
Although the first Congress recognized the national policy implica-
tions of the Copyright Clause by enacting the first copyright law in 1790, 13 
it was not until 1897 that the first criminal copyright provision found con-
gressional approval.14 That provision established a misdemeanor penalty 
for unlawful performances 'and presentations of copyrighted dramatic and 
musical compositions. In order for the penalty to be imposed, it was nec-
essary to establish that the defendant's conduct was "willful" and "for 
profit. "15 The 1909 Copyright Act extended the misdemeanor penalty to 
all types of copyrighted works, except sound recordings, and continued the 
same mens rea language.16 Sound recordings were brought within the cov-
erage of the statute by the Sound Recording Act of 1971.17 The 1976 
Copyright Act restated the offense of copyright infringement as a misde-
meanor, providing fines of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not 
more than one year or both.18 In the case of sound recordings or motion 
pictures, the statute provided for fines of up to $25,000 or imprisonment 
for not more than one year or both. Repeat offenders could be fined up to 
$50,000 or punished by up to two years of imprisonment or both. The 
1976 Act changed the mens rea element to require that the infringing con-
duct be engaged in "willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain."19 
It was not until 1982, almost two hundred years after the first copy-
right statute and eighty-five years after the first criminal provision, that 
felony sanctions for copyright infringement were authorized. In that year, 
responding to the demands of the sound recording and motion picture in-
12 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). 
13 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
14 Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-82. 
15 Id. 
16 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 33 Stat. 1075-82. 
17 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. 
18 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
19 Id. 
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dustries,20 criminal copyright infringements involving the reproduction or 
distribution of records, motion pictures and audiovisual works were desig-
nated as felonies.21 While the criminal offense was still defined in Title 17, 
the copyright title of the U.S. Code, the felony penalty provisions were 
established in a new section of Title 18, the crimes and criminal procedure 
title. 22 The felony penalty provision applied to a defendant convicted of 
reproducing or distributing, during any 180-day period, at least one thou-
sand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or more 
sound recordings or at least sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in 
one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works.23 The penalties 
consisted of imprisonment of the infringer for up to five years, a fine of up 
to $250,000 or both.24 The same fine, with imprisonment for no more than 
two years, applied in the case of more than one hundred but less than one 
thousand phonorecords and more than seven but less than sixty-five copies 
of motion pictures or other audiovisual works.25 All other criminal copy-
right infringement offenses continued to be classified as misdemeanors. 26 
A case involving a felony prosecution under the 1982 Act came to my 
court in 1991.27 The defendant, one Julio Larracuente, owned and oper-
ated a videocassette rental store. An investigator for the Motion Picture 
Association of America identified tapes rented by the store as counterfeit, 
and a surveillance was undertaken by the investigator and, later, by an FBI 
agent. The defendant was observed unloading boxes of blank videotapes 
from his car into his home and taking videotapes from his home to his 
store. A search of his house, conducted pursuant to a warrant, revealed 
1,670 counterfeit videocassettes of movies, 78 VCRs, videotape copying 
equipment of various types and hundreds of cassette covers and stickers. 
The jury convicted defendant of both the substantive and conspiracy of-
fenses of criminal copyright infringement. In answer to interrogatories, 
the jury specifically found that the defendant had made at least sixty-five 
copies of copyrighted films within a 180-day period, the statutory thresh-
old calling for a punishment of up to five years in prison and a fine of up to 
$250,000. The district court imposed a sentence of twelve months, the bot-
tom of the guidelines sentencing range. 
20 Mary Jane Saunders, Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Copyright Fel-
ony Act, 71 Denv. U.L. Rev. 671, 676 (1994). 
21 Act of May 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91. 





21 See United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672 {2d Cir. 1992). 
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We took the opportunity in the Larracuente case to address two issues 
previously unresolved in our circuit. One was a defense analogous to the 
defense of "first sale, "28 and the other was the method of ascertaining "re-
tail value" under the Sentencing Guidelines.29 It was the contention of the 
defendant on appeal that the govemment had failed in its obligation to 
prove that licensees of the copyright owners had not authorized him to 
reproduce the films. We decided that the elements of the criminal offense 
to be proven were the same as those in a civil copyright case-ownership 
of a valid copyright and copying. It was, of course, also necessary for the 
government to establish the mens rea requirement as well as the numer-
osity and temporal threshold requirements. The possession of a sub-li-
cense, we held, was a matter of affirmative defense.30 Even if the absence 
of a sub-license was an element, a defendant would have to introduce 
some evidence of a sub-license in order for the prosecution to shoulder the 
burden of negating that element beyond ~ reasonable doubt. This shifting 
of the burden of production seems to be the better approach and has been 
taken by most courts in connection with the similar defense of "first sale," 
which permits the owner of a copy lawfully made to sell or otherwise dis-
pose of the copy without the authority of the copyright owner.31 The first 
sale doctrine is said to vitiate the copyright owner's power to prevent fur-
ther sales or dispositions, and the legislative history seems to oblige a de-
fendant to come forward with evidence that the copies were legally made 
in order to take advantage of the first sale doctrine. 
Turning to the sentencing issue in Larracuente, I first note that I am 
no fan of the Sentencing Guidelines. When the Guidelines took effect in 
November of 1987, their starting point was the average sentence that had 
been imposed before the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, which spawned the Guidelines.32 The Sentencing Commission never 
has really taken a fresh look at those averages, with the result that some 
sentences remain much too high and some remain much too low. In any 
event, we now have a formulaic approach to sentencing, based in large 
part on the offense rather than upon the offender. So much for giving 
sentencing discretion to a commission rather than to a judge! It seems to 
me, in light of the national policy with which we are concerned, that the 
penalties for copyright felonies are much too low. Turning to the specific 
formula for the offense of copyright infringement, we find that the base 
offense level of six is to be enhanced as follows: "If the retail value of the 
2s Id. at 673-74. 
29 Id. at 674-75. 
30 Id. at 673-74. 
31 See 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David N"unmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.12[B] 
[hereinafter Nimmer]. 
32 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Ch. 1, Pt. A, 4(g). 
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infringing items exceeded $2,000, increase by the corresponding number of 
levels from the table" that applies to fraud and deceit offenses.33 If that is 
not confusing enough, the Guidelines Commentary advises us that 
"'[i]nfringing items' means the items that violate the copyright ... Jaws 
(not the legitimate items that are infringed upon)."34 We are also told that 
"the value of the infringing items ... will generally exceed the loss or gain 
due to the offense. "35 
In Larracuente, we approved the district judge's application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.36 The judge accepted the prosecution expert's tes-
timony that the retail price of the films copied averaged $73 per copy. She 
multiplied that price times 2,652 tapes, which included those seized from 
defendant's home and from a store he supplied as well as those purchased 
by investigators. Tue total, $193,596, resulted in a 7-Ievel adjustment, 
which, in the case of Larracuente converted to a sentencing range of 
twelve to eighteen months. He was sentenced on the low end of the range, 
an especially light sentence considering the statutory maximum of five 
years. Defendant's operation appeared to be a substantial one, but, ac-
cording to the Sentencing Guidelines table, defendant as a first offender 
would have had to infringe more than $80 million dollars worth of retail 
value to get the maximum sentence of imprisonment. And that is one of 
the reasons why I say that the Guidelines make no sense. 
The most recent amendment to the criminal copyright statute, en-
acted in 1992, has an interesting history. Congress originally had before it 
a bill to elevate the piracy of computer software from a misdemeanor of-
fense to a felony offense.37 The bill came in response to a serious escala-
tion in the infringement of computer software copyrights and was intended 
to make the unauthorized production and distribution of multiple copies 
of computer software equally as culpable as the unauthorized production 
and distribution of multiple copies of phonorecords, sound recordings and 
motion pictures.38 
Remarks attributed in the Congressional Record to Senator Hatch 
included the statements that "stiffer penalties toward piracy do act as a 
deterrent to these types of crimes," and that "these new penalties for 
large-scale violations of copyright in computer software will have a similar 
deterrent effect."39 The remarks also included the following: "If we do 
not address the piracy of these programs, we may soon see a decline in this 
33 Td. § 2BS.3(b )(1). 
34 Td. appl. note 1. 
35 Td. appl. note background. 
36 952 F.2d at 674-75. 
37 S. Rep. No. 893, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
38 S. Re[. No. 268, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992). 
39 138 Cong. Rec. S7580 (June 4, 1992). 
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vibrant and important sector of our economy."40 ·Referring to the 1982 
statute and the felony penalties provided therein, Senator Hatch said: "It 
is my understanding that this law, the criminal enforcement of copyright 
statute found at 18 U.S.C. § 2319, has worked well since its enactment."41 
I do not know where Senator Hatch obtained this information, but it is 
wrong. H the 1982 statute was intended to deter piracy in records and 
movies, it has failed woefully. But I suppose that rose-colored glasses are 
part of the equipment of a United States Senator. 
The bill to increase criminal sanctions for the violation of software 
copyrights underwent a metamorphosis in the House of Representatives. 
It was there decided that the felony penalty provisions should be extended 
across-the-board to all types of large-scale copyright infringement, includ-
ing motion pictures, books, records and computer software.42 The bill 
eventually became "An Act to amend title 18, United States Code, with 
respect to criminal penalties for copyright infringement." Further remarks 
attributed to Senator Hatch on the return of the bill from the House in-
cluded this important comment: 
[T]his criminal statute is not designed to reach instances of per-
missible, private home copying, nor does it represent any in-
fringement on traditional concepts permitting the fair use of 
copyrighted materials for purposes of research, criticism, schol-
arship, parody and other long-recognized uses.43 
We hear in these remarks the language of fair use, which apparently is to 
be as good a defense to criminal copyright infringement as it is to civil 
copyright infringement. Moreover, the legislative history indicates that 
the Copyright Felony Act is not to be applied to "ordinary business dis-
putes such as those involving reverse engineering of computer programs or 
contract disputes over the scope of licenses. "44 
Section 2319 in its new form still refers to Tttle 17 to define the mens 
rea element of criminal copyright infringement. Tiile 17 provides: 
Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes 
of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be pun-
ished as provided in Section 2319 of title 18.45 
But effective October 28, 1992, the penalty provisions of section 2319 were 
expanded to apply to all copyright infringements. For purposes of the fel-
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See 138 Cong. Rec. Hll29 (Oct 3, 1992). 
43 138 Cong. Rec. S17958 (Oct. 8, 1992). 
44 H.R. Rep. No. 997, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992). 
45 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). 
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ony penalties, the threshold numerosity requirements have been signifi-
cantly reduced, but a minimum value threshold has been added. 
The five-year sentence, $250,000 fine provisions now apply to one 
who reproduces or distributes during any period of 180 days "at least 10 
copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted works, with a retail 
value of more than $2,500."46 For a second or subsequent copyright fel-
ony offense, the maximum prison sentence is ten years.47 Again, it is un-
likely that anyone will ever receive such a sentence. According to those 
wonderful Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant would need to be responsi-
ble for more than $80 million dollars worth of infringing items and have 
something like five prior felony convictions to get a ten-year sentence. 
For criminal copyright infringements that cannot meet the threshold 
requirements, as regards reproduction or distribution rights, misdemeanor 
penalties continue to apply. Such penalties also continue to apply to viola-
tions of adaptation, performance and display rights. It is a rare thing in-
deed for a United States Attorney to initiate a misdemeanor prosecution 
in any case, let alone a copyright infringement case. It should be noted, 
however, that in connection with any criminal copyright conviction the 
court must order the forfeiture and destruction of the infringing copies or 
phonorecords as well as all equipment used in manufacturing the items.48 
Any sentence for a copyright infringement crime may also, of course, enti-
tle the victim to restitution under the federal Victim and Witness Protec-
tion Act.49 
The addition of a minimum retail value threshold in the 1992 amend-
ment to the felony copyright statute has raised once again the question 
posed by the Sentencing Guidelines' reference to "retail value." It is gen-
erally understood that the definition given by my court in Larracuente was 
the correct one: retail value, in a case involving copies of good quality, is 
the suggested retail price of the legitimate copyrighted work when it was 
released and not the value of the infringing copies. so If the work is not 
ordinarily marketed through normal retail channels, courts may look to 
the wholesale price, the replacement cost of the item or financial injury to 
the copyright owner.51 Whatever approach is used, it should not be diffi-
cult to reach the $2,500 retail value threshold for a felony prosecution, 
46 18 u.s.c. § 2319(b)(l). 
47 Id. § 2319(b)(2). 
48 17 u.s.c. § 506(b). 
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 3663; see also Roger J. Miner, Victims and Witnesses: New 
Concerns in the Criminal Justice System, 30 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 757 (1985). 
50 See 138 Cong. Rec. S17958 (Oct. 8, 1992); see also Nimmer, supra note 31, 
§ 15.0l[B], at 15-7. 
51 Nimmer, supra note 31, § 15.0l[BJ, at 15-7. 
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considering value generally in this day and age. And that raises some in-
teresting questions. 
For example, a panel of my court recently held that the defense of fair 
use was not established where a company reproduced and distributed to 
its scientists for archival use certain articles of interest taken from scien-
tific journals. 52 I do not say whether or not the panel opinion is the last 
word on the subject. I do raise the question whether, if enough copies of 
the articles (certainly more than ten) were distributed within a period of 
180 days and had a value that could be proved to exceed $2,500, the felony 
threshold could be met. And that would lead to the question of whether 
there could be said to exist a willful infringement for purposes of commer-
cial advantage or private financial gain. Is the distribution of articles to be 
filed away by scientists for possible future use in their work an activity 
manifesting a purpose of commercial activity or private financial gain? 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has said that it is sufficient in a 
criminal prosecution to show that infringing activity is intended for com-
mercial advantage or private financial gain, and that such advantage or 
gain need not be realized.53 In the context of our civil case, we noted that 
the company did not gain a direct or immediate commercial advantage, 
and we classified the use as "intermediate."54 How such a classification 
would stand up in a criminal case remains to be seen. 
The failure of the fair use defense also may result in the imposition of 
criminal liability upon book publishers. There is at least exposure to crim-
inal liability in cases where large chunks of copyrighted material are lifted 
from the work of the original author and inserted in the work of another. 
Having written an opinion on the issue of fair use of unpublished material 
in a biographical novel,55 I am well aware of the fine line between fair use 
and foul play.56 Although my opinion did not receive the unanimous ap-
proval of the copyright community and may well have been a contributing 
cause to the amendment of the fair use statute, the defendant publisher 
actually prevailed on the defense of !aches. Assuming that the use of the 
unpublished material was impermissible, would criminal liability attach? 
Certainly there was distribution for commercial advantage. I think that a 
good criminal defense lawyer would argue that willfulness could not be 
established and, accordingly, that mens rea could not be proved beyond a 
52 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994). 
53 United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987). 
54 American Geophysical, 31 F.3d at 889-90. 
55 See New Era Publication Int'! v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 
1989), reh'g deni.ed, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 
(1990). 
56 Roger J. Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play, 37 J. Copyright 
Soc'y 1 (1989). 
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reasonable doubt. The lifting of entire books and publications, however, 
clearly would fall under the criminal copyright statute, although it does not 
appear that very many prosecutions of book infringers have occurred to 
date. 
It does not in fact appear that very many prosecutions of any kind 
have occurred under the copyright infringement statute. According to the 
Statistical Reports of the United States Attorneys' Offices, 46 criminal 
copyright cases were filed and 64 cases were terminated in 1993. 57 In 
1992, 54 cases were filed and 46 were terminated.58 These are national 
statistics and seem to pale into insignificance in the face of the enormity of 
the problems the criminal copyright statute was designed to resolve. For 
example, the Software Publishers of America ("SPA") has estimated that 
software vendors lost $2 billion in the United States in 1991 due to illegal 
software copying.59 93% of those polled by the SPA said that they had 
copied or used software illegally at some time.60 It was estimated that 
there were ten illegal copies for every legal copy of a computer game and 
five illegal copies for every legal copy of non-game software.61 In a house-
hold survey, up to 50% of software in household use was found to be cop-
ied. 62 The problem of identifying software piracy in homes, referred to by 
one author as "softlifting,"63 is a particularly difficult one. Software piracy 
in general has proven difficult to investigate, and the SPA, sometimes re-
ferred to as the "software police," have gone so far as to provide a Manual 
to assist the FBI and the United States Attorneys in the investigation and 
prosecution of software piracy.64 According to one news dispatch, the 
SPA is considering the pursuit of legislation that would criminalize the 
illegal copying of software, whether done for profit or not.65 
The disease is only slightly less virulent in the case of recordings and 
motion pictures. The Motion Picture Association of America estimates 
57 United States Department of Justice, Statistical Report.for the United States 
Attorneys' Offices: Fiscal Year 1993, table 3. 
58 United States Department of Justice, Statistical Report for the United States 
Attorneys' Offices: Fiscal Year 1992, table 3. 
59 Susan Athey & John Plotnicki, Would the Software Police Fmd Your Company 
Guilty?, J. Sys. Mgmt., Oct. 1994, at 32. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.; see also David Germain, Digital Technology Aids Pirates, Alb. Times 
Union, Mar. 6, 1995, at BS (discussing piracy involving CD-ROM games). 
62 Athey & Plotnicki, supra note 59. 
63 See David M. Hornick, Combatting Software Piracy: The Softlifting Problem, 7 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 377 (1994); see also Greg Short, Combatting Software 
Piracy: Can Felony Penalties for Copyright Infringement Curtail the Copy-
ing of Computer Software?, 10 Computer & High Tech. L.J. 221 (1994). 
64 Hornick, supra note 63, at 393. 
65 See PR Newswire, Software Publishers Association Position Statement on the 
Lamacchia Decision, January 5, 1995. 
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that filmmakers lose $220 million dollars a year in domestic sales.66 The 
Recording Industry Association says it loses $600 million each year due to 
domestic music piracy.67 Estimates of the losses sustained through the 
piracy of American copyrighted works world-wide are mind-boggling: 
$12 billion dollars annually in the case of recordings; $2 billion dollars 
annually in the case of films; and $7.5 billion annually in the case of busi-
ness application software. 68 The protection of American industry from 
foreign piracy has become a goal of our national foreign policy. This is so 
because foreign nations have seemed quite reluctant to assist in the en-
forcement of our country's copyrights, especially by criminal prosecution. 
For example, it has been estimated that 95 % of all software installed in 
Russia has been obtained illegally. 69 Bootleg videocassettes in Russia are 
available in titles not yet available in the United States.70 Copyright laws 
generally are ignored, and there are no criminal enforcement penalties in 
Russia. 
The problems of intellectual property piracy in China have been 
widely reported, and one source has estimated the cost to United States 
industries through the piracy of U.S. patents, trademarks and copyrights in 
China at nearly $1 billion dollars per year.71 According to one news dis-
patch, "[t]he U.S. has been pressing China to raid 29 plants in Southern 
China, which allegedly flood Asia with pirated laser and compact discs."72 
On the verge of imposing punitive tariffs on Chinese exports, the U.S. 
Trade Representative reported to Congress on a recent agreement 
whereby China promised to enforce vigorously copyright and other intel-
lectual property rights.73 An enforcement mechanism supposedly was cre-
ated to investigate, prosecute and punish infringing activities throughout 
China. Time will tell whether the Chinese government is interested in 
eradicating this billion-dollar industry. 
But China and Russia are not the only countries that fail to enforce 
copyright Jaws with adequate criminal penalties. Mexico was, until 1991, 
one of seven countries with the largest pirate industries and least effective 
66 John M Glionna, High Tech Robbery: A Boom in Bogus Tapes, CDs and 
Videos Has Police Redoubling Anti-Piracy Efforts, L.A. Ttmes, SepL 13, 
1994, business section, at 3. 
67 Id. 
68 Id.; PR Newswire, supra note 65. 
69 Athey & Plotnicki, supra note 59. 
70 Michael Specter, Latest Films for $2: Vuleo Piracy Booms in Russia, N.Y. 
Tnnes, Apr. 11, 1995, at A3. 
71 To Higher Authority: Some Shift in U.S.-China Talks, Daily News, Feb. 20, 
1995, at C9. 
72 Id. 
73 Prepared Statement by Michael Kantor Before the House Ways and Means Sub-
committee on Trade, Fed. News Serv., Mar. 9, 1995. 
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intellectual property protections.74 Apparently, Mexico reformed its 
copyright laws in 1991 to expand enforcement activities. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement, to which Mexico is a signatory, refers to 
criminal enforcement of intellectual property but leaves it to each signa-
tory to define the violations. There are recent reports of the enactment of 
criminal provisions for the infringement of copyright law in Poland, 75 
Belgium,76 Thailand,77 and Panama.78 But as with every criminal statute, 
there must be investigation and prosecution if the statute is to have any 
meaning. Past experience does not bode well for the future on the inter-
national scene. In the event that we cannot get the cooperation of other 
countries, I have a thought with regard to the matter. 
It is a well-settled principle of international law that a nation may 
attach criminal liability to acts occurring outside the nation that produce 
effects within the nation.79 This theory of jurisdiction was enunciated by 
Justice Holmes in a 1911 Supreme Court decision in which he wrote: 
"Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing 
effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he 
had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him 
within its power."80 Of course, Justice Holmes was talking about a domes-
tic state rather than a foreign state, but the principle is the same. Congress 
has relied on this theory of jurisdiction to prohibit the manufacture of 
drugs in foreign nations intending the substances to be imported into the 
United States or knowing that they will be so imported.81 If we cannot get 
the cooperation of foreign nations for the investigation and prosecution of 
copyright crimes that victimize the American economy and American na-
tional interests, extra-territorial jurisdiction may be an option. 
Prosecution begins at home, however, and there seems to be precious 
little of that at present. Given the tendency of United States Attorneys to 
become interested in high-profile crimes, there probably is not much ro-
mance for them in tl1e prosecution of copyright crimes. To be fair, how-
ever, the federal prosecutors cannot possibly prosecute in every situation 
involving an activity defined as criminal by a generous Congress. Selectiv-
74 Laurie L Levenson, NAFTA: A Criminal Justice Impact Report, 27 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 843, 859 (1994). 
75 Polish Copyright Law Takes Effect, J. Proprietary Rights, July 1994, at 33. 
76 Belgium Moves to Increase Copyright Protection of Software, J. Proprietary 
Rights, Sept. 1994, at 34. 
77 Thailond Senate Approves Expanded Copyright Protection, J. Proprietary 
Rights, Nov. 1994, at 35. 
78 Panama's Copyright Law Takes Effect, J. Proprietary Rights, Jan. 1995, at 31. 
79 See, e.g., Restatement (Third} of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 401 (1986). 
80 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). 
81 21 u.s.c. § 959. 
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ity is necessary. There are, nevertheless, certain other crimes that often 
accompany criminal copyright infringement and that can be charged along 
with it. This is the type of "piling on" that may be interesting to prosecu-
tors. The number of these other crimes is severely restricted by the Dow-
ling case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1985.82 In that case, which 
involved the manufacture and distribution of bootleg Elvis Presley record-
ings, the Court held that the statute proscribing the interstate transporta-
tion of goods stolen or taken by fraud did not cover this conduct. The 
Court observed that the property rights of copyright holders have a char-
acter distinct from the possessory interests of the owners of other goods. 
It concluded that the history of the criminal infringement provisions of the 
Copyright Act indicated that Congress did not intend to cover the conduct 
in question under the interstate transportation rubric. Most commentators 
are of the opinion that the Dowling case restricts the prosecution of copy-
right infringement to the criminal copyright statute.83 
There are some other federal criminal statutes dealing specifically 
with copyright activities other than the felony statute whose evolution I 
have been discussing. These include fraudulent use of a copyright no-
tice,84 fraudulent removal of a copyright notice,85 and false representation 
in connection with a copyright application.86 Conspiracy to commit any of 
the copyright crimes also is, of course, a separate crime.87 The crime of 
money laundering encompasses criminal copyright infringement as a 
"specified unlawful activity."88 It is interesting that felony copyright in-
fringement is not listed as one of the predicate offenses under the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organization statute.89 I think that the 
prosecution of copyright crimes would be considerably enhanced if it were 
included. Effective December 8, 1994, a new copyright felony has been 
added: unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and 
music videos of live musical performances.9!l A new section 2319A has 
been added to Title 18 of the U.S. Code as part of the Bill entitled "An 
Act to Approve and Implement the Trade Agreements Concluded in the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations." The new statute per-
tains to sounds and images of a live musical performance and provides 
felony penalties for violations. The lack of performance protection in the 
82 See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 1JJ7 (1985). 
83 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 31, § 15.05, at 15-24. 
84 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(c). 
85 Id § 506{d). 
86 Id § 506(e). 
87 18 u.s.c. §§ 2, 371. 
88 See id. § 1956(c)(7). 
89 See id. § 1961(1). 
90 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Dec. 8, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, ch. 11, 
§ 513, 108 Stat. 4974. 
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provisions of section 2319 finally are remedied by the adoption of section 
2319A. 
There is a serious question whether copyright-related activities can be 
the subject of criminal prosecution in the state courts. Apparently, some 
state law enforcement agencies proceed on the basis of state fraud laws or 
statutes imposing sanctions for passing off counterfeit merchandise.91 In 
1973, the Supreme Court decided that it was permissible to convict under 
a California statute providing criminal penalties for piracy of sound re-
cordings.92 The Court held there was no violation of the Supremacy 
Oause because there was then no conflict with the federal copyright law. 
This situation changed entirely when the Sound Recording Act of 1971 
was passed by Congress. Latman makes the fiat-out statement that 
"[s]tate prosecution for criminal activity with regard to copyright infringe-
ment are, of course, preempted, except as regards pre-1972 sound record-
ings."93 His authority is section 301 of Title 17, which does provide for 
federal preemption of the entire field of copyright. I am not as sure as 
Latman that state laws can so easily be written off. In this regard, I refer 
to section 3231 of the Federal Criminal Code: 
The district courts of the United States shall have original 
jurisdiction exclusive of the States of all offenses against the laws 
of the United States. 
Nothing in this Title shall be held to take away or impair the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws 
thereof.94 
Whether or not the states have some residual or peripheral area of 
responsibility, it seems clear that Madison had it right when he said that 
states cannot make effective provisions in these cases. The states just do 
not have the resources or the expertise to pursue the criminal prosecution 
of copyright infringement. I predict that there will be greater involvement 
of federal law enforcement agencies in these prosecutions. The author of 
one article suggesting that the Copyright Office may become obsolete in 
the next century has observed "that it appears that virtually every copy-
right infringement is a misdemeanor and a great many are felonies. "95 Ac-
91 Matt Hicks, S.F. Cops Lack Tools to Catch High-Tech Criminals: Technology 
Constantly Changing, Vwlence Top Priority, S.F. Examiner, Feb. 16, 1995, at 
Al; see also Joseph Scott, He is the Fashion Police, N.Y. Magazine, Mar. 6, 
1995, at 36. 
92 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
93 Alan Latman, The Copyright Law 295 (6th ed. 1986). 
94 18 U.S.C. § 3231; see Roger J. Miner, Preemptive Strikes on State Autonomy: 
The Role of Congress, 99 The Heritage Lectures 7-8 (1987). 
95 Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office Be Obsolete in the 11venty-First 
Century?, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ. 55, 64 (1994). 
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cordingly, one of her proposals is that the FBI might take over the 
Copyright Office. I would not go that far! 
In view of the national interests served, copyright infringement prop-
erly has been designated a federal crime. The provisions for increased 
penalties have not yet had much of a deterrent effect, as is evidenced by 
the rise in large-scale infringements of all types of copyrighted works. The 
resourcefulness of the infringers is well-known to all who are interested in 
copyright protection. Some adjustments in the Sentencing Guidelines may 
be required so as to increase the penalties for copyright crimes. Also, the 
RICO statute might be extended to include copyright felonies as predicate 
acts, but the real problem seems to be that too few federal prosecutions 
have been instituted to make the criminal provisions a credible deterrent 
to copyright infringement. Greater efforts must be made by those affected 
to cooperate with federal law enforcement authorities by bringing in-
fringements to their attention and assisting in the investigations.96 With 
this type of assistance, perhaps there would be more activity in this area by 
the United States Attorneys. In any event, it seems to me inevitable, given 
the increasing boldness of those who engage in large-scale copyright in-
fringement, that all of us who are concerned with copyright law will be 
more and more involved in considering copyright crimes. 
96 See Kent Walker, Federal Criminal Remedies for the Theft of Intellectual Prop-
erty, 16 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 681, 689 (1994). 
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